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Over the past fifteen years, the presence in Russia of several million labour migrants from Cen-
tral Asia has been a key determinant of the region’s stability. This migration has contributed to 
reducing internal problems and has helped provide a source of income to societies in specific 
countries. At present, due to the economic crisis, Russia is unable to continue its involvement 
in relieving socio-economic tensions in the region. Remittances from migrants have declined 
by 50% over the last three years. Undeveloped Central Asian economies are unable to offer 
an alternative to labour migration and other states which migrants previously chose as destina-
tion, such as Kazakhstan, Turkey and China, are not in a position to replace Russia in this respect. 
Potentially, this generates the risk of a destabilisation of the socio-political situation in the 
most vulnerable countries of the region and may trigger a flow of migration from Central Asia 
to countries other than these three countries, including to the EU. This latter phenomenon has 
already occurred on a limited scale in Tajikistan, the state which most depends on labour migra-
tion. Over the last two years, there has been a rapid, more than five-fold increase in the number 
of citizens of this country who have applied for asylum in the EU. Even if large-scale migration 
pressure from Central Asia to the EU is unlikely, an increase in the number of migrants from 
Central Asia to the EU is conceivable. Due to the fact that Russia is a key transit route, Moscow 
may use this as an instrument of pressure towards the EU, especially the Central and Eastern 
European states which, in turn, would be more dangerous than the migration pressure itself.
The migration trends recorded 
in the region so far
In Central Asia, migrations have a well estab-
lished historical and social background. The 
large number of migration processes and their 
reach observed both in the Soviet era1 and dur-
ing the first years following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union have resulted in the emergence 
of social and cultural standards which popu-
1 For example evacuations during the Second World War, 
the forced resettlement of whole nations (for example 
Chechens to Kazakhstan or Crimean Tatars to Uzbeki-
stan) or in later times major Soviet agricultural and in-
dustrial projects carried out in the region.
larised migration in the region and fostered in-
creased mobility in the local population2.
At present, the basic migration model is labour 
migration to Russia, mainly from Tajikistan, Uz-
bekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Migrations became 
a large-scale phenomenon at the beginning of 
the present century and at its peak in 2013 more 
than 2.7 million citizens of Uzbekistan, more 
2 For example the numerous migrations to historical 
homelands (mainly to Russia and Germany and, in the 
case of Crimean Tatars – to Ukraine) or countries pursu-
ing an active policy of repatriation of ethnic minorities 
(for example to Poland and Israel). In Tajikistan, which 
saw a civil war in 1992–1997, refugees and internally 
displaced persons were an additional problem (as high 
as 1.2 million individuals).
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than 1.2 million citizens of Tajikistan and almost 
600,000 citizens of Kyrgyzstan were working in 
Russia3. Labour migrations from Central Asia are 
caused by multiple factors including the rapid 
demographic development4 of Central Asian 
states, structural poverty resulting in the lack of 
alternatives to labour migration as viewed from 
the perspective of entire societies, easy access 
to the Russian labour market for citizens of the 
region’s states and Russia’s demand for cheap 
labour. Moreover, labour migration is facilitat-
ed by authoritarian governments in the region’s 
states, who treat them as a unique safety valve 
enabling them to rid themselves of the most ac-
tive individuals, i.e. those who pose the biggest 
threat to the regime. Besides them leaving the 
country, they also secure a source of income 
for society.
Remittances from labour migrants are the main 
source of income for the impoverished societies 
of some of Central Asian states. In 2013, the fi-
nal year preceding the economic crisis in Russia, 
their value was nearly US$ 13.6 billion, of which 
US$ 6.7 billion was sent to Uzbekistan, US$ 4.2 
billion to Tajikistan and US$ 2.1 billion to Kyr-
gyzstan5. Tajikistan is the most striking case –
3 Data compiled by the Federal Migration Service of the 
Russian Federation: http://www.fms.gov.ru/fms/activity/
stats/Statistics/Svedenija_v_otnoshenii_inostrannih_
grazh
4 Between 1990 and 2015 the region’s population in-
creased by 36.9% – from 50.216 million to 68.755 mil-
lion. When analysed taking into account migration from 
the region following the collapse of the USSR, this in-
crease is de facto even more prominent. Data compiled 
by the World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
SP.POP.TOTL?end=2015&start=1990
5 The value of remittances from natural persons. Data 
compiled by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation: 
http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/?Prtid=svs&ch=Par_17101#-
CheckedItem
in 2013 remittances compared with country’s 
GDP were equal to about 41% of its size (which 
is the highest coefficient globally)6. 
Labour migration is both long-term – a portion 
of labour migrants permanently settle in Russia 
and are even granted Russian citizenship – and 
seasonal, mainly in the third and fourth quarter 
of the year. Migrants from Central Asia are scat-
tered across Russia, with major groups living in 
big cities, mainly Moscow and Saint Petersburg, 
and, to a lesser extent, in Siberia. Due to the 
diversified nature of migration in Russia highly 
active, mainly informal, Central Asian ethnic mi-
gration networks have emerged.
The exhaustion of the current model
A number of economic and social processes 
seem to suggest that the current model of mi-
gration from Central Asia is beginning to wear 
out. At the same time, these processes may fos-
ter increased migration flow from this region 
to countries other than Russia, including the 
EU states. 
The economic crisis in Russia and the devalu-
ation of the rouble are the main factors driv-
ing the change of the current migration model. 
They have caused a rapid, progressing decline in 
the value of remittances from labour migrants 
stemming from Central Asia. Due to the crisis, 
these remittances declined by 48% – from US$ 
13.6 billion in 2013 (the final year preceding the 
crisis) to US$ 6.9 billion in 2016 (a drop of 2.95% 
compared with 2015). When broken down into 
the individual countries of the region, this de-
cline is the biggest in the case of Uzbekistan 
(around 59%, from US$ 6.7 billion to 2.7 bil-
lion) and Tajikistan (54%, from US$ 4.2 billion 
to 1.9 billion). It is less prominent in the case 
of Kyrgyzstan (17%, from US$ 2.1 billion to 1.7 
billion)7. It is worth noting that Russian media 
6 Author’s calculation, data from the Central Bank of the 
Russian Federation and the World Bank. 
7 Remittances from natural persons. Data compiled by the 
Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
Remittances from labour migrants are 
the main source of income for the impov-
erished societies of some Central Asian 
states.
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claims that there has been an increase8, instead 
of a decrease in the value of remittances, result 
from applying incorrect or possibly manipulat-
ed methods for calculating this value9. 
The above-mentioned decline in the value of 
remittances from labour migrants is partly off-
set by a considerable depreciation of the cur-
rencies of Central Asian states against the US 
dollar (and the remittances are usually made 
in US dollars). Although in the short term this 
helps reduce (but not eliminate) the negative 
impact of the declining value of remittances 
from labour migrants, in the long term it will 
lead to inflation and the continued deteriora-
tion of socio-economic standards in the coun-
tries of the region. This, in turn, will contribute 
to maintaining the need for large-scale labour 
migration from the region’s states.
The decline in the value of remittances is ac-
companied by a drop in the number of labour 
migrants from Central Asia in Russia, but the re-
lation is not linear. In the case of Uzbekistan in 
2013–2016 this number fell by 28%, in the case 
of Tajikistan by 36%, whereas the figure for Kyr-
gyzstan remained unchanged (when compared 
to 2015 an increase of 13% was recorded result-
8 For example http://www.fergananews.com/news/26167
9 This mainly concerns the Fergana news agency which 
until 2016 was using the Central Bank’s data regarding 
remittances made via money transfer systems (in Rus-
sian: Трансграничные переводы, осуществленные 
через платежные системы), and since the begin-
ning of 2016 it has used data regarding remittances 
made by natural persons (in Russian: Трансграничные 
переводы физических лиц по основным странам-
контрагентам). Comparing figures calculated according 
to the method applied in 2015 to those calculated ac-
cording to the other method applied in 2016 indicates 
an increase. This, however, is manipulation.  
ing from Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the Eurasian 
Economic Union)10. The non-linear proportion 
between the value of remittances and the num-
ber of migrants results from the lack of alterna-
tives to working in Russia. Central Asian econo-
mies are undeveloped and backward – they are 
unable to generate the number of jobs required 
by societies with booming demographic statis-
tics (for example in Tajikistan 35% of citizens 
are aged 15 or under11). In addition, over ten 
years of large-scale labour migration to Rus-
sia has solidified the socio-economic model in 
which the main source of income for society 
(in particular in Tajikistan) are the wages earned 
by migrants. 
Searching for alternatives to labour 
migration to Russia 
The countries of the region are aware of the 
fact that the current model is unsustainable 
and their governments are making formal at-
tempts to seek out new labour markets for 
their economic migrants. One example of these 
attempts is the decree by the government of 
Tajikistan issued in August 2016 which orders 
specific ministries to launch actions to seek new 
labour markets for Tajik migrants, other than 
the Russian market12.
Countries other than Russia have already been 
the destination for labour migrants from Cen-
tral Asia. As many as several hundred thousand 
labour migrants from this region are working 
in Turkey, Kazakhstan, China and the East Asian 
states, with the largest group, most probably 
10 Data compiled by the Federal Migration Service (FMS) 
of the Russian Federation in April 2016: http://www.
fms.gov.ru/fms/activity/stats/Statistics/Svedenija_v_ot-
noshenii_inostrannih_grazh. In April 2016 the FMS was 
dissolved and its duties have been transferred to the 
Ministry of the Interior – since then the statistics regard-
ing the number of foreigners in Russia had not been 
updated until February 2017, which was when another, 
non-compatible method was adopted. 
11 Data compiled by the World Bank: http://data.world-
bank.org/indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS
12 Previously, similar actions had been carried out also in 
Uzbekistan; http://www.fergananews.com/news/25178
Central Asian economies are undevel-
oped and backward – they are unable 
to generate the number of jobs required 
by societies with booming demographic 
statistics. 
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between 150,000 and 300,000 individuals, 
working in Turkey13. Although the number of 
migrants is increasing, due to several factors, 
such as availability of a local workforce and le-
gal barriers14, these countries may serve as an 
alternative only for specific groups of labour 
migrants, not for all of them. In addition, as 
with Russia, some of these countries, for exam-
ple Kazakhstan, are themselves going through 
an economic crisis, which in turn limits their ab-
sorption capability. 
The economic crisis in Russia (understood not 
only as a decline in the GDP growth rate, but 
also as a situation in which this figure remains 
at the same crisis level or records a slight in-
crease15), the drop in real wages offered on 
the Russian market16 and the usual destination 
countries’ inability to fully absorb labour mi-
grants from Central Asia all indicate that the 
interest in the EU as a potential destination 
for labour migration will likely increase. This is 
fostered by a number of social factors which 
make EU countries increasingly attractive to 
migrants from Central Asia. The relatively high 
wages, even in eastern EU countries, are one 
13 Most of them are staying there illegally, which makes it 
difficult to quote a precise number. In Turkey, which is 
the main destination for labour migration to countries 
other than Russia, there are around 70 000 citizens of 
Central Asian states (Turkmenistan in particular) le-
gally living and working there; http://m.turkinfo.nl/
turkiye-de-yasayan-yabanci-sayisi-650-bin-kisiyi-gec-
ti/13956/
14 For example citizens of Uzbekistan are not required to 
obtain an Uzbek exit visa when travelling to Russia.
15 As forecast for example by the IMF: http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16229.pdf
16 https: //www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-stud-
ies/2017-02-06/painful-adaptation-social-consequenc-
es-crisis-russia
such factor, especially when compared to the 
declining US dollar equivalent of salaries of-
fered in Central Asia and Russia. Another im-
portant, albeit hardly measurable factor, is the 
region-wide conviction that Central Asia and 
Europe, especially the countries of the former 
Communist bloc, are closely related when 
it comes to cultural heritage. This conviction 
is the legacy of the Soviet era and has already 
impacted migration behaviour in Central Asia17. 
In addition, from the vantage point of migrants 
from Central Asia, access to the EU is relative-
ly easy when it comes to logistics, despite the 
visa regime. Despite considerable geographical 
distance, the number of borders which need to 
be crossed is small. Russia and Belarus are eas-
ily accessible, means of transport (a well-devel-
oped logistical base facilitating travel to Russia, 
and a transportation network centred around 
Moscow) are widely available – especially to 
migrants who are already in Russia. Another 
psychological factor impacting the decision to 
travel to the EU involves Russian propaganda 
frequently using the motive of the 2015 mi-
grant crisis in the EU to show that European 
institutions and states are unable to stop large-
scale migration18.
The migration trends from Central Asia 
to the EU and human rights
Since the collapse of the USSR, the main form 
of migration from Central Asia to EU countries 
has been the planned repatriation of ethnic 
minorities by European states which are the 
historical homelands to these minority groups. 
17 For example groups of around 200 Kazakh Salafis, who 
in 2006 chose the Czech Republic as destination for their 
emigration due to having been persecuted in Kazakh-
stan. They were convinced of cultural proximity and 
aware of the importance the Czech Republic attaches to 
the question of human rights (as evidenced by the loca-
tion of the main office of Radio Free Europe in Prague); 
http://rus.azattyq.org/a/Salafit_Salafits_Kazakh_refu-
gees_/1378639.html and http://pravozashitnik.at.ua/
news/2009-10-05-327
18 One example of this are reports aired in a popular opin-
ion journalism broadcast “Vesti Nedeli” on the Russian 
state television channel Rossiya 1, see for example http://
www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2663652
The economic crisis in Russia and inabil-
ity of the usual destination countries to 
fully absorb labour migrants from Cen-
tral Asia indicate that the interest in the 
EU as a potential destination for labour 
migration will likely increase.
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It culminated in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
Refugee migrations are another phenomenon 
which has been recorded over the last decade, 
although so far its scale has been limited. Even 
serious crises in Central Asia, which generated 
large number of refugees in the region itself 
(for example the 2005 rebellion in Andijan in 
Uzbekistan and the 2010 conflict in southern 
Kyrgyzstan), resulted in in the number of Cen-
tral Asian refugees in EU countries increasing 
merely by several hundred individuals, perhaps 
as many as one thousand. However, the situa-
tion has changed over the last two years; this 
is evidenced by an unprecedented increase in 
the number of asylum applications submitted 
in the EU by citizens of Tajikistan, the poorest 
country in the region. A more than five-fold in-
crease in this number has been recorded – from 
590 individuals in 2014 to 3,205 individuals in 
201619. This increase has been caused by both 
actual human rights violations in the region 
and by socio-economic factors.
In Central Asia, human rights violations are 
widespread, with the situation in some coun-
tries, for example Tajikistan, deteriorating even 
further20. Cases of human rights violations hap-
pen not only in authoritarian states such as 
Uzbekistan21, Turkmenistan22 and Tajikistan23, 
but also in the relatively open and democratic 
Kyrgyzstan24. Persecution for being practicing 
independent (not necessarily radical) forms of 
Islam occurs in all the countries of the region25. 
This results both in increased numbers of per-
secuted individuals (on political or religious 
grounds), for whom asylum in the EU is the 
19 Data compiled by Eurostat: http://appsso.eurostat.
ec.europa.eu/nui /show.do?dataset=migr_asyap -
pctza&lang=en
20 https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chap-
ters/tajikistan
21 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253193.pdf
22 http://www.humanrights.gov/dyn/countries/turkmeni-
stan.html
23 https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-
central-asia/tajikistan/report-tajikistan/
24 http://freedomhouse.kg/prava-cheloveka-v-kyrgyzstane/
25 http://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=1780
only alternative (it is not possible for them to 
stay in CIS countries), and in attempts by labour 
migrants to obtain asylum and thereby legalise 
their stay in the EU. 
Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) and the Islamic Revival Party 
of Tajikistan (IRPT) are very good examples of 
the phenomena discussed above. Hizb ut-Tahrir 
is a political organisation aiming to create 
a caliphate using peaceful, political methods26 
– although the organisation’s goal is radical, its 
operating methods fit in the political spectrum. 
HT operates legally in the EU (until recently its 
main headquarters were in London), whereas in 
the CIS (besides Georgia and Ukraine) it is con-
sidered a terrorist organisation and membership 
of it is punishable27. Therefore, for HT members 
from Central Asian states, migration to Russia is 
not an option and asylum in the EU is frequently 
the only way of escaping persecution. 
The case of the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan 
(IRPT) shows a different side to the problem. 
The party was established on the basis of Islam-
ic opposition in the aftermath of the civil war 
in Tajikistan. Until 2015 it had representation 
in the Tajik parliament and was the only legally 
operating Islamic party in the region. Despite its 
name, it is not a strictly religious party and its 
main declared goal is the secular modernisation 
of the state with respect for Islamic values. Its 
members included believers in various lines of 
Islam. In the 2013 presidential race, in concert 
with the Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan, 
26 Hizb ut-Tahrir condemns politically-motivated violence 
and is strongly disliked by Islamic radical and terrorist 
organisations.
27 For more on Hizb ut-Tahrir see https://www.osw.waw.pl/
sites/default/files/homojihadicus.pdf
Over the past two years, there has been 
a more than five-fold increase in the 
number of asylum applications submit-
ted by citizens of Tajikistan in the EU. 
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it supported Oynikhol Bobonazarova, a secu-
lar oppositionist and human rights defender28. 
In 2015, the party was formally dissolved by the 
government, and was later considered a terror-
ist organisation and banned29. Under pressure 
from the government, most of its members had 
left the party before it was formally dissolved30, 
with only a small and easily identifiable group 
remaining active in exile (including the leader 
Muhiddin Kabiri) or being a victim to repression 
by Tajik government31. 
In public debate, the rapid increase in the num-
ber of asylum applications submitted in the EU 
by citizens of Tajikistan (this has been observed 
over the last couple of years) has been associ-
ated with the situation surrounding the IRPT32. 
Although it is beyond doubt that the rising 
number of citizens of Tajikistan seeking asylum 
in the EU does include IRPT members who are 
under threat of persecution, the number of ac-
tive IRPT members, who do not cooperate with 
the government and are really threatened by 
persecution, is smaller than the number of in-
dividuals applying for asylum in the EU33. This 
increase is mainly related to the deteriorating 
economic situation in Russia, which forces cit-
izens of Tajikistan to seek other destinations 
for labour migration. Alongside this, the actual 
28 http://avesta.tj/2013/09/17/kabiri-prosit-sezd-podder-
zhat-ojnihol-bobonazarovu/
29 For more on IRPT see https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/
default/files/homojihadicus.pdf and https://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2016-03-16/ta-
jikistan-a-chronic-stagnation
30 http://old.news.tj/ru/node/210335
The fact that the IRPT is heavily infiltrated by Tajik secu-
rity services is another question. 
31 h t t p : / / w w w . b b c . c o m / r u s s i a n / i n t e r n a t i o n -
al/2016/06/160602_tajikistan_islam_party_trial
32 For example https://amnesty.org.pl/tadzyccy-uchodz-
cy-na-polskiej-granicy/
33 According to the party’s governing bodies, it had up to 
40,000 members in its peak years. However, this num-
ber seems to have been massively overestimated, as 
evidenced both by problems with collecting signatures 
ahead of the 2015 presidential election and the scale 
of the wave of arrests and persecutions that followed 
these events (several hundred individuals). A more cred-
ible number would be several thousand members in the 
party’s peak years. The vast majority of them left the 
party in August and September 2015. 
human rights violations in the region (includ-
ing in Tajikistan) enable labour migrants to use 
asylum as a method for legalising their stay in 
the EU. This fosters the merging of these two 
groups and results in mixed migration flows, 
similar to the 2015 migration crisis and Syrian 
refugees who accounted for a mere 28% of 
the total number of individuals seeking asylum 
in the EU34. 
Another factor that may foster increased migra-
tion flows from Central Asia to the EU is po-
tential destabilisation of the situation in the re-
gion; this cannot be ruled out in the long term. 
The deterioration of the socio-economic situ-
ation due to the crisis in Russia increases this 
risk. In addition, several permanent structural 
threats to the region’s stability have emerged35 
and serious local crises tend to occur regularly 
every couple of years. Examples of such crises 
include the previously mentioned 2005 rebel-
lion in the city of Andijan in Uzbekistan and 
the ethnically motivated conflict in southern 
Kyrgyzstan in 2010. These two events gener-
ated large numbers of refugees and internally 
displaced persons – in 2010 110,000 individuals 
fled from Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan and anoth-
er 300,000 were internally displaced36. Due to 
increased interest in the EU as a potential loca-
tion for seeking asylum, prolonged destabilisa-
tion in the whole of Central Asia or in any of the 
region’s states, contrary to similar situations in 
the past, will likely trigger increased numbers 
34 Data compiled by Eurostat: http://appsso.eurostat.
ec.europa.eu/nui /show.do?dataset=migr_asyap -
pctza&lang=en
35 For more see https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikac-
je/osw-studies/2014-10-28/hostages-to-moscow-cli-
ents-beijing-security-central-asia-role-west. 
36 http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/
Full_Report_490.pdf
Russia is playing the key role when it 
comes to the increased migration flow 
to the EU.
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of refugees who may consider the EU to be 
an attractive destination37. 
Under Russia’s control
Russia is playing the key role when it comes to 
increased migration flow to the EU. At present, 
in Russia there are at least 3.5 million labour 
migrants from Central Asia who may be the 
first source of such a migration flow. Moreover, 
the transport route from Central Asia to the EU 
runs through Russia. Nor should it be ruled out 
that Moscow may wish to use the question of 
migration from Central Asia and Chechnya to 
the EU to exert political pressure on EU mem-
ber states or to stoke tensions within the EU 
connected with the problem of controversial 
migration.
Russia has both the possibility to generate mi-
gration pressure and to later manage the prob-
lem when it naturally occurs. Firstly, similar to 
Turkey in the case of Syrian refugees, Russia is 
a major centre for labour migrants from Cen-
tral Asia. Secondly, Moscow has a vast array of 
means to control them at its disposal. These in-
clude legal and administrative instruments (the 
question of legalised stay and work permits), 
the threat of deportation, and social pressure 
(the possibility of managing the dislike of mi-
grants from Central Asia which Russian socie-
ty manifests). Thirdly, Central Asian societies 
have almost exclusively been part of the Rus-
sian information area, which enables Moscow 
to shape the social mood in the region’s states. 
Finally, Russia and Belarus have a logistical base 
for routes from Central Asia to the EU – there 
is a well-developed network of transport con-
nections from Central Asia to Russia and there 
are criminal groups who have been involved in 
facilitating illegal migration to the EU, including 
via Belarus (for example of Chechens or citizens 
of Vietnam), for years now38. 
37 For comparison, the civil war in Tajikistan, which took 
place in the 1990s, resulted in 1.2 million refugees and 
internally displaced persons (mainly Afghanistan and 
the post-Soviet states).
38 https://ria.ru/world/20160927/1477929324.html
One example of Moscow’s readiness to use mi-
gration pressure for political purposes involves 
the emergence of a migration route, used for 
example by Syrians, running via Russia to Fin-
land and Norway39. Although the number of in-
dividuals who have made it to Norway and Fin-
land using this route is small when compared to 
the main migration routes, this situation gener-
ated complex political consequences, especially 
for Finland, which is an EU member state40.
In a situation where there is a significant in-
crease in the number of migrants coming from 
Central Asia and the emergence of a migration 
route via Russia and Belarus to the EU, it can-
not be ruled out that citizens of other countries, 
who in large numbers are seeking asylum in the 
EU, may want to use it as well. This mainly in-
cludes citizens of Afghanistan (186,000 individ-
uals in 2016, accounting for 14.8% of all asylum 
seekers in the EU)41, for whom the route via 
Central Asia and Russia would be a cheaper and 
safer alternative to the present route running 
through Iran, Turkey, Greece and the Balkans42.
39 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/rus-
sia-and-norway-are-in-a-two-way-battle-to-repeated-
ly-reject-the-same-refugees-a6755031.html and http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-nor-
way-border-idUSKCN10Z1IC. 
40 For more see https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
analyses/2016-04-06/enforced-cooperation-finnish-rus-
sian-migration-crisis. 
41 Data compiled by Eurostat: http://appsso.eurostat.
ec.europa.eu/nui /show.do?dataset=migr_asyap -
pctza&lang=en
42 http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analy-
sis/FRAN_Q1_2016_final.pdf
One example of Moscow’s readiness 
to use migration pressure for political 
purposes involves the emergence of 
a migration route running via Russia to 
Finland and Norway.
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Conclusions
The risk of increased migration flow from Cen-
tral Asia to the EU is mainly caused by the weak-
ness of Central Asia’s economies and their de-
pendence on remittances from labour migrants 
working in Russia. The value of these remittanc-
es has declined rapidly in recent years. Certain 
threats may be connected with the merging 
of minor refugee migrations recorded to date, 
caused by actual human rights violations in the 
region, and labour migrations for which the in-
strument of asylum will be used as a method for 
legalising migrants’ stay in the EU. On a small 
scale this has already been observed for citizens 
of Tajikistan seeking asylum in the EU. Over the 
last two years, they have increased in number 
more than five-fold. Considering the dynamics 
of the social process involving the increased 
migration (asylum seekers) of Tajiks to the EU, 
this should not be ignored, even if the scale of 
this phenomenon has so far been insignificant. 
It heralds increased interest in the EU as a des-
tination for refugees and migrants. Taking eco-
nomic factors in Central Asia and Russia into ac-
count, this means that within the next couple of 
years, even if no major destabilisation occurs in 
the region, the emergence of increased migra-
tion pressure from this region to the EU is likely 
and could involve between ten thousand and 
even several dozen thousand individuals per 
year. This concerns mainly those EU states which 
border Russia and Belarus: the Scandinavian 
countries, the Baltic states and Poland. Despite 
the incomparably smaller number of individu-
als involved, threats resulting from this pressure 
will be all the more serious for the eastern EU 
states than the 2015 migrant crisis because Rus-
sia is likely to use them to stoke tensions within 
the EU and gain political advantage.
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2. Remittances from Central Asian labour migrants in Russia (in US$ millions)
country/year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Uzbekistan 1693 3007 2071 2857 4275 5694 6689 5653 3059 2741
Tajikistan 1667 2549 1740 2229 3040 3651 4173 3853 2219 1928
Kyrgyzstan 771 1212 925 1129 1572 1859 2106 2062 1384 1743
Kazakhstan 195 297 216 309 442 461 560 577 514 559
Turkmenistan 30 50 34 35 35 36 41 30 16 9
Region 4356 7115 4986 6559 9364 11701 13569 12175 7192 6980
Data: Central Bank of the Russian Federation
3. Labour migrants from Central Asia in Russia (in thousands)
country/year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Uzbekistan 2333 2734 2581 2149 1756
Tajikistan 1061 1229 1178 999 879
Kyrgyzstan 524 576 552 508 574
Data source: Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation
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Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Number of individuals 205 210 210 295 590 1125 3050
4. Citizens of Tajikistan seeking asylum in the EU
Data source: Eurostat
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5. Remittances from labour migrants from Central Asia per country (in US$ millions per quarter)
Data: Central Bank of the Russian Federation
